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Abstract 
The objective within the study is to evaluate the modalities of  the Chinese power projection, within 
the country´s strategy to gain access to develop crude reserves in developing countries. Liberal 
Institutionalist perspectives upon the concept of  power are applied as the central theoretical 
framework for analysing the Chinese performance in the cases of  energy cooperation with 
Kazakhstan, Angola and Venezuela.  A strong reliance upon tangible power resources as material 
inducement is identified as an essential part of  the Chinese energy strategy. This also serves as a 
necessary pre-condition for the establishment of  channels through which intangible power resources 
can be applied. 
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Resumo 
O objetivo do estudo é avaliar as modalidades da projeção chinesa de poder dentro da estratégia deste 
país para obter acesso para desenvolver reservas de petróleo em países em desenvolvimento. 
Perspectivas Liberais Institucionais sobre o conceito de poder são aplicadas como arcabouço teórico 
central para analisar a atuação Chinesa nos casos de cooperação na área de energia com Cazaquistão, 
Angola e Venezuela. Uma forte dependência de recursos de poder de natureza tangível, como indução 
material, é identificada como parte central da estratégia energética da China. Isto também serve como 
uma pré-condição necessária ao estabelecimento de canais por meio dos quais recursos de poder de 
natureza intangível possam ser aplicados. 
Palavras Chaves: China; Recursos naturais; Energia; Petróleo; Poder. 
 
 
Resumen 
El objetivo del estudio es evaluar las modalidades de la proyección de poder chino, dentro de la 
estrategia del país para conseguir desarrollar recursos de petróleo en países en vía de desarrollo. 
Perspectivas Liberales Institucionales sobre el concepto de poder son aplicadas como marco teórico 
central para analizar la actuación china en los casos de cooperación energética con Kazakstán, Angola 
y Venezuela. Una fuerte dependencia de recursos de poder de naturaleza tangible, como medio de 
inducción material, es identificada como parte esencial de la estrategia china. Esto también sirve como 
pre-condición para el establecimiento de canales a través de los cuales recursos de poder intangibles 
puedan ser aplicados. 
Palabras-clave: China; Recursos naturales; Energia; Petroleo; Poder. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective within the present study is to evaluate the modalities of  the Chinese 
power projection, as part of  the country´s strategy to gain access to develop crude reserves 
in developing countries. Thereby, the aim of  the analysis is to understand how the application 
power recourses becomes evident in particular Chinese interactions with crude producers. 
                                                          
1 DOI deste artigo: 10.5380/recp.v6i1.39783. 
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The article departs from the hypothesis that the exercise of  power, as part of  the Chinese 
recourse acquisition strategy, is a multifaceted process, through which a range of  interrelated 
power recourses become activated. The liberal institutionalist perspective serves as the 
central theoretical framework for the study. The notion of  power is treated through 
conceptualizations by Joseph Nye (1990; 2004; 2011) combined with Zhimin Chen and Lulu 
Chang´s (2013) further elaborations of  this. The article is structured as a case study, within 
which recent Chinese relations with Kazakhstan, Angola and Venezuela are reviewed in order 
to be able to classify the Chinese power projection with regards to the different conceptual 
dimensions, to which it relates. A parallel objective is to assess the consistency between 1) 
the fundamental Chinese foreign policy goals, 2) the country´s strategy regarding energy 
related cooperation and obtainment, as well as 3) the specific tactics applied in the source 
countries examined. A strong reliance upon tangible power resources for material 
inducement is identified, as an essential part of  the Chinese energy strategy. This however, 
should not be understood as being in contrast to or as incompatible with measures of  soft 
power inducement, but rather as a necessary pre-condition for the establishment of  channels 
through which intangible power resources can - and have - been applied. 
 
2. POWER AND ITS EVOLVING DIMENSIONS 
 The Chinese strategy for overseas resource acquisition and the modality of  power 
which the country employs in line with this must be evaluated, in relation to the constantly 
changing structural opportunities for the exercise of  power, within the present global 
scenario. As a leading liberal-institutional scholar, Joseph Nye has elaborated the evolving 
nature of  power, in a series of  productions since the end of  the cold war. In his work from 
1990, Bound to Lead, Joseph Nye emphasizes how power has become less coercive, less 
fungible and less tangible (NYE, 1990). This is due to an increasing complexity of  
international politics, which means that a strong overall leverage which one country enjoys 
in relation to another will not necessarily translate into the former being able to shape the 
outcome of  an issue, within which the later also has a stake (NYE 1990, p.175). Increasing 
interdependence is also a factor which limits the options for successful coercive power 
application, thus, in many instances rendering measures based upon attraction, as the most 
efficient strategy (Ibid, pp.190-191). In his later work from 2004, Soft power: the Means to 
Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye operates with the concept of  power divided into hard 
power and soft power; whereas hard power rests on the material capability to command or 
induce and is associated with tangible resources, soft power is constituted by intangible 
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resources such as co-option and agenda setting (NYE 2004, p.7). Nye (2011) similarly 
underlines that hard power resources contain both the potential for coercion as well as 
attraction, depending upon their mode of  application (NYE 2011, p.16). Soft power, on the 
other hand is defined as "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of  framing 
the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred 
outcomes." (Ibid, pp.20-21). Different power resources are also related to certain types of  
goals. Soft power is particularly useful for shaping an environment according to preferred 
norms of  interaction, whereas hard power often proves to be more effective in obtaining 
more specific and tangible objectives, - a category within which Nye counts the acquisition 
of  natural resources (Ibid p.16). The notion of  smart power constitutes one of  Nye´s most 
recent elaborations of  the general concept. With this, Nye questions the idea that the 
possession of  power recourses necessarily will lead the wielder to obtain his/her preferred 
outcomes in a ratio proportional to the amount of  power applied. The process of  power 
application by itself  constitutes a vital intermediate link, which is analyzed with particular 
regards to essential questions such as the preferred outcome, recourses available in the given 
context, the positions of  objects sought influenced, which type of  power is more likely to 
be useful, and finally, with what probability? (Ibid, pp.208-209). Nye thereby ''opens'' the 
concept of  power to become more dependent upon relational and contextual complexities. 
      Adapting Joseph Nye´s conceptualizations of  the differentiated nature of  power into an 
operational framework, used to analyze the contemporary Chinese power projection within 
the international system, Chen and Chang (2013) elaborate this through a model containing 
the dimensions of  attraction versus coercion, referring to the mode of  power application, 
and material versus non-material, referring to the nature of  power resources (CHEN & 
CHANG 2013, p.10). Attraction can thereby rely on both material resources, - soft hard-
power - as well as non-material resources - soft soft-power. The same way, coercion can both 
take place through non-material means, as well as by the application of  material resources, 
or rather, through hard soft-power or hard hard-power, as illustrated in figure 1 below: 
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In the case of  China, the authors nevertheless underline that the country by and 
large tends to rely on attraction rather than coercion, ascribing this circumstance to the 
country´s tradition of  ´peaceful diplomacy´ (Ibid p.18). Regarding Chinese resource 
acquisition abroad, which mostly takes place far from its military sphere of  influence, it is 
also logical that an analysis of  the modalities of  the country´s power application related to 
this purpose, must focus upon measures of  attraction, as coercion must be presumed to be 
an inefficient strategy, under the present conditions.  
From the constructivist perspective, the liberal-institutional perception of  power 
has been criticized for "falling into the realist trap" of  basically accepting the materialist 
nature of  power, while still reserving some space for a "relative autonomous" essence of  
ideational power. Alexander Wendt stresses the importance of  turning attention towards the 
discursive conditions shaping the perceptions related to, - and thereby the essential nature of  
the exercise of  - power. Emphasis is thereby laid upon how the differing contexts of  meaning 
shape the causal outcome of  materialist explanations (WENDT 1999, pp. 135-137). In line 
with this argument, the intention in the following analysis is thereby also to assess how the 
"perceptual reception" of  the Chinese application of  power resources is bound to lead to 
different outcomes depending upon the normative and ideational context, within which they 
are effectuated.    
Another question relates to whether it is indeed possible to characterize the great 
variety of  different interactions between both private and public Chinese entities on the one 
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hand, and those of  a raw material exporting abundant countries on the other, as part of  the 
same ´resource strategy´. David Lampton underlines that the Chinese foreign policy-making 
has become increasingly pluralized and characterized by the presence of  a great multiplicity 
of  actors and institutions (LAMPTON 2001, p.4). This has also been paralleled by an 
emerging Chinese perception of  the necessity of  cultivating power in a broad range of  
different spheres (SHAMBAUGH 2013, p.6) which also complicates the task of  clearly 
illustrating that efforts made within one apparently autonomous issue area, are at least 
partially undertaken in order to promote specific objectives related to another issue. 
Economy and Michael also stress the fact that there is a great internal competition between 
Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which often act according to their own objectives 
(ECONOMY & MICHAEL 2014, p.51). Yet the authors still indicate a correlation between 
Chinese aid and infrastructure provision, and a subsequent facilitation of  access to resources. 
(Ibid, p.55). McCarthy (2013) also finds that even though Chinese SOEs adhere to certain 
centrally mandated ´guiding principles´, they often make decisions based upon purely 
commercial rationale, and should not merely be perceived as policy instruments 
(MCCARTHY 2013, p.279).   
Some relevant circumstances related to evaluating the connection between Chinese 
power projection and foreign energy acquisition objectives must be considered in the specific 
national context, within which it occurs. These are primarily concerned with 1) making the 
case that a multi-faceted power projection is at least in some degree related to the specific 
goal of  accessing energy resources, and 2) distinguishing potentially "mercantilistic" aspects 
of  Chinese energy companies and related entities behavior concerned with national energy 
security concerns, from ´normal´ market oriented behavior. The cases of  Kazakhstan, 
Angola and Venezuela, which are revised in the course of  the article, have been selected 
according to the denominator of  all being countries in relation to which energy interests are 
central within the Chinese foreign policy planning. Consequently, a certain degree of  
presence of  energy related concerns within a multifaceted power projection strategy, is 
presumed to be evident in the instances of  interactions examined within Chinese 
engagement with energy providers. In instances when the application of  varying power 
resources appear to significantly and persistently foment Chinese SOE´s access to energy 
sources, the strength and particular nature of  this relationship can then be further elaborated, 
yet, without assuming a necessary "one-to-one" correlation.   
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Finally, country cases from different geographical contexts have been selected, due 
to the intention of  identifying consistent features of  the Chinese policies for energy foreign 
acquisition, independent of  the influences of  any specific regional geopolitical situation.   
 
3. OIL STRATEGY WITHIN GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY GOALS  
 Since the end of  the cold war, China has been adhering to certain fundamental 
policy prescriptions defining the country´s international engagement. In the late 1980íes the 
Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping formulated the Tao Guang Yang Hui principle which refers 
to a policy of  a very modest exposure of  capabilities and keeping a low profile, as a central 
guideline for the Chinese international engagement (ZHAO 2013, p.103). The notion of  Yu 
Guoji Jiegui which can be characterized as the aspiration of  ´linking up to the international 
track´ complemented these policies through the ambition of  abiding to common norms of  
interaction and cooperation within the international society (XIAOYU 2012, p.355). An 
essential objective within this foreign policy orientation was to stride towards an international 
insertion, which would provide the necessary conditions for national development 
(SHAMBAUGH 2013, p.7; SUTTER 2012, p.12). Since the mid 1980íes, a new strong 
emphasis was assigned to Jingji Waijiao - economic diplomacy - within Chinese foreign affairs 
(HAMRIN 1998, p.89). In a speech in 1999, then Premier Minister Zhu Rongji established 
Zou Chuau - going out - as a prescriptive concept, referring to the need for resource entities 
and oil companies to create a solid international strategy for the overseas supply of  such vital 
inputs for the growing Chinese economy (ECONOMY & MICHAEL 2014, p.49). During 
the Jiang Zemin era, this also resulted in the Chinese state becoming increasingly involved in 
providing conditions which would spur such international engagement, through tax breaks, 
cheap credits and low interest funding (Ibid).       
As has often been indicated by China specialists and pundits, the issue of  resource 
scarcity poses a major challenge for the Chinese economy (SUTTER 2012, p.74). Markets 
which are characterized by steadily dwindling reserves and a rapidly increasing demand, such 
as the global oil trade, are very prone to a certain degree of  zero-sum competition, which 
highlights the potential for conflict. This poses the question as to whether the ambition of  a 
discrete low-profile engagement within these by China is indeed possible, and whether the 
country´s means to obtain energy resources are fundamentally distinct from those applied 
by established players. A Chinese whitepaper on Africa from 2013 stresses the 
complementarity between China´s need for resources and many African countries´ need for 
investment and infrastructure provision. The overseas investment by Chinese enterprises is 
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encouraged and their role in the construction of  infrastructure is similarly underlined, yet, 
along with the importance of  this taking place ´in accordance with international practice and 
the rules of  the market economy´. Furthermore, the whitepaper also stresses that the new 
type of  strategic Sino-African relationship also builds upon cultural and educational 
foundations, such as student exchange and joint research initiatives (CHINA GOV. 2013). 
Another whitepaper on energy from 2007 stresses the importance of  ´common 
development of  energy around the world´ as well as making ´ positive contributions to worlds 
energy security and stability´ (CHINA GOV. 2007). The whitepaper furthermore dedicates 
a section to ´Improving external cooperation in the exploration and development of  oil and 
gas resources.´ Hereby, the importance of  product-sharing contracts and joint exploration 
and development, together with foreign companies, as well as their contractual security, is 
underlined. Interestingly, the Chinese government does affirm its ambition of  depending less 
upon spot markets, through the encouragement of  long-term supply contracts and the 
diversification of  trading channels (Ibid). Robert Sutter criticizes this strategy and underlines 
that it expresses a lack of  commitment to regulating scarcity on oil markets through 
institutional engagement, as well as a narrow focus upon Chinese energy security. Sutter 
furthermore underline that the high premium which China often pays for its oil wields a 
negative effect upon global prizes, as seen through a net-importer´s perspective, such as the 
US (SUTTER 2012, p.103). Suisheng Zhao exposes a similarly negative perspective regarding 
the non-conflictual prospects for future Chinese energy acquisition, by emphasizing that the 
country faces strong attempts by established powers to block its further access to energy 
resources (ZHAO 2013, pp.109-110). Hence, it becomes important to evaluate whether the 
present demand imperatives posed by the dramatically increasing Chinese energy 
consumption are in effect possible to reconcile with the stated goal of  cooperative mutually 
beneficial interactions, within both the general Chinese foreign policy strategy, and within its 
energy policies.   
Other central elements within Chinas foreign policy agenda, which in some measure 
also are related to the country's overseas energy acquisition have to do with the principle of  
non-intervention in internal political affairs, and its goal of  a non-hegemonic world order. 
The principle of  non-intervention is clearly expressed within a Chinese whitepaper on Africa, 
wherein it is mentioned that China will seek to pursue developmental goals in cooperation 
with African countries, ´without setting any political conditions´ (CHINA GOV. 2010). Zhu 
Liqun defends this principle by making the argument that the idea of  non-interference is a 
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natural product of  a colonial history, which China and African countries share, also meaning 
that it thereby expresses a mutually shared perception, and thus cannot be perceived as 
unilaterally imposed by China (LIQUN 2010, p.43). In effect, the anti-interventionist policy 
does clear some ground for energy related cooperation with authoritarian or repressive 
regimes, which western companies, at least in principle, should be more constrained from 
doing business with. The anti-hegemonism has paralleled the policies of  modernization and 
international opening, since these were established by Deng Xiaoping (HAMRIN 1998, 
p.75). The de-hegemonization of  international affairs is an integral part of  the notion of  a 
harmonious world, and is thereby both a prescriptive goal within Chinese foreign policy, but 
also a descriptive concept referring to the perception of  a more multi-polar world order in 
the 21st century (LIQUN 2010, p.27).   
The principle of  non-intervention as well as the idea of  de-hegemonization imply 
an ideational framework with a certain co-optive potential, which at least should be 
considered with regards to the specific national context, within which they are interpreted. 
Though the universalist appeal and emancipatory nature of  these foreign policy doctrines 
can be questioned, they nonetheless may contain a certain degree of  attraction, not only for 
ruling elites, but more importantly, a broader popular appeal, strongly related to colonialist 
experience and third world oriented ideology. As it is stressed by Xiaoyu, it becomes 
important to consider the role of  non-western nations in shaping international norms, rather 
than an a-priori acceptance of  the general validity of  norms founded upon an occidental 
worldview (XIAOYU 2012, p.347). The norms of  non-intervention and de-hegemonization 
are also of  a clearly intangible nature, and it is therefore presumed that they may imply a 
certain potential as a soft-power resource. Their effectiveness is subsequently to be evaluated 
in the specific country cases with regards to their possible influence on Chinas energy 
strategy.   
 
4. CHINESE ENGAGEMENT I KAZAKHSTAN 
 China first became a net-importer of  oil and gas in 1993 (JIAN 2011, p.3), which 
roughly coincided with the disintegration of  the USSR and thereby also the independence 
of  the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Since then, China has been expanding its ties 
with these areas on basis of  the intrinsically intertwined twin objectives of  assuring stability 
in its western border regions and obtaining energy supplies (SUTTER 2012, p.242). The 
Sino-Kazakh relationship therefore implies a range of  different and interrelated high-priority 
foreign policy concerns, spanning over both energy and security related issues, (ECONOMY 
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& MICHAEL 2014, p.150) and cannot be understood from the assumption that only the 
resource security vector lies at the heart of  the dynamics of  interactions. The energy and 
security related Chinese interests in Kazakhstan have nevertheless been sought enforced 
mutually, and the substantial investments in oil and gas pipelines in order to connect 
Kazakhstan to Chinas western Xinjiang province, also contain an element of  consolidation 
of  control in the border region (DANREUTER 2011, p.1356-1357). In 2006 China and 
Kazakhstan also held a joint military exercise, on behalf  of  Chinese initiative (LI & WANG 
2009, p.11). Regardless of  its essentially security related constitution, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) has also become a very important institutional vehicle for 
treating energy related questions (LIAO 2006, p.67). As the SCO is based upon 
comprehensive corporative security and mutual enforcement of  confidence building 
measures (SHAMBAUGH 2013, p.25) it also stimulates a series of  integrative dynamics 
which are likely to spill over into the energy related field. Economy and Michael also point 
to the reciprocal relationship of  complementary interests pertaining to the realms of  energy 
politics in the Central Asian theatre in effect have come to push regional politics in a more 
cooperative direction (ECONOMY & MICHAEL 2014, p.163).    
As roughly 80% of  Chinas oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait 
(SHAOFENG 2010, p.2), the Central Asian oil deposits offer a very attractive opportunity 
for diversification of  imports (PETERSEN & BARYSCH 2011; 2013, p.40). Facing a steadily 
rising import demand since the early 90´s, Chinese SOEs embarked on a series of  
acquisitions within the newly opened Kazakh oil sector, with a strong financial and 
diplomatic backing from the Chinese state. In 1996, the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) obtained a 60.3% stake in Aktobe Munai Gaz from the Kazakh 
government, as this had opened up for prospective bidding by foreign companies. In the 
process, CNPC managed to outbid both the US oil companies of  Texaco and Amoco and 
the Russian Yujnimost. This success has been ascribed to CNPC´s promise to build a US$3.5 
billion 3.000 kilometer pipeline, crosscutting Kazakhstan and ending in China (MCCARTHY 
2013, p.272). In total, the deal amounted to a US$9.5 billion investment, and in spite of  delays 
with the construction of  the pipeline, it was finally completed in 2006 (SUTTER 2012, p.242-
243).   
Another important step for CNPC in Kazakhstan, was the takeover of  
PetroKazakhstan in 2005, which granted the Chinese SOE exclusive ownership of  the 
Kumkol South field and a shard exploitation of  the Kumkol North field, together with the 
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Russian Lukoil (LIAO 2006, p.66). Preceding high-level negotiations between the Chinese 
and Kazakh leadership, - supposedly including the personal involvement of  Hu Jintao - are 
said to have been a decisive factor in cementing the acquisition of  PetroKazakhstan, totaling 
a sum of  US$4.18 billion (MCCARTHY 2013, p.276). The purchase was accompanied by a 
straightening of  Sino-Kazakh relations the same year with the signing of  the ´strategic 
partnership´ agreement, which also to some extend can be seen as a counter measure to a 
markedly increased US presence in the region in the post 9/11 period. Chinese foreign policy 
analyst Xuanli Liao draws a clear connection between the establishment of  this strategic 
partnership and the successful acquisition of  PetroKazakhstan, in face of  competition from 
both the Indian Oil & Natural Gas Corp. and Lukoil. (LIAO 2006, pp.66-67)      
The situation with Chinese public institutions as financiers in various respects has 
thus become a defining trait in Chinas engagement in order to procure access to Kazakh 
crude reserves. In recent years, this tendency has been exacerbated by political involvement. 
The Chinese leadership spurred the China Exim Bank to provide a US$5 billion loan to the 
Kazakhstan Development Bank for infrastructure projects and CNPS has also directly 
funded the domestic Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak gas pipeline in southern Kazakhstan. Such loans 
have been concessional of  CNPC´s increased - and in many cases preferential - access to 
hydrocarbon resources, as well as the possibility to buy an equity stake in MangistaMunaiGaZ 
in 2009 (MCCARTHY 2013, p.277). The marked governmental involvement in securing 
especially CNPCs access to Kazakh energy reserves has significantly contributed to 
Kazakhstan becoming the country with the highest Chinese oil industry equity share in the 
world, reaching 23% in 2010. In spite of  this, not all of  CNPCs equity oil is shipped back to 
China through the newly constructed pipelines, but is rather sold on the world market, 
depending on the particular price conditions and possibilities for profit maximization which 
the Chinese SOE faces at a given time. (JIANG & SINTON 2011, p.18) Along with these 
measures, China has sought to strengthen its ties with Kazakhstan through the establishment 
of  transportation and other economic links (IBRAIMOV 2009, p.51). Joseph McCarthy also 
emphasizes that the close political involvement by the Chinese leadership in guaranteeing 
CNPCs operational environment in Kazakhstan, must be seen as a consequence of  an 
increasingly reassertive Kazakh leadership, seeking to maximize gains from foreign oil 
companies operations in the country, and in some cases also threatening international oil 
companies (IOCs) with renationalization (MCCARTHY 2013, p.271-272). The same decisive 
impact of  the policy support is stressed by Xuanli Liao, who hints that such politically created 
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privilege helps to compensate Chinese companies for a more modest financial stance, than 
that enjoyed by many large IOCs (LIAO 2006, p.68).  
 
5. POST-CONFLICT ANGOLA AND THE CHINESE ENTRANCE 
 Diplomatic ties between China and Angola span back to 1983, although a deeper 
relationship was only forged by the internationalization of  the Chinese economy, which led 
the country to amplify its global search for natural resources (ALVES 2013, p.107). The 
cessation of  internal hostilities in 2003 provided the foundation for the establishment of  
constitutional order, which also led to more stable conditions for investments and financing 
for the development of  the Angolan oil industry (BURGOS & EAR 2012, p.355). The 
Chinese and Angolan developmental goals were of  an apparently complementary nature, 
with China possessing ample financial resources and facing a steadily growing demand for 
oil, whereas Angola was in need of  obtaining the necessary capital to develop its abundant 
hydrocarbon resources (ALVES 2010, p.6). In this situation, China particularly assumed the 
role of  a long-term financer, (BURGOS & EAR 2012, p.358) with the China Export-Import 
Bank (Exim Bank) occupying a central role, by extending a total of  more than US$10 billion 
in oil-backed credit lines to the Angolan government from 2004-2010 (CORKIN 2011, p.1).  
In 2002, the Exim Bank and China Construction Bank funded the electrical grid 
projects in major Angolan cities as well as the initial stage of  Luanda´s railway rehabilitation 
(ALVES 2010, p.11). The establishment of  concessional loans destined to finance 
infrastructure projects and other mayor public works, has also been a significant element 
within the Sino-Angolan relationship during the first decade of  the new millennium. The 
first of  such credit lines was extended to Angola by the Exim Bank in 2004, and the US$2 
billion loan was dependent upon the purchase of  at least 70 % of  construction materiel, 
equipment and labor services from China (ALVES 2013, p.108). The extension of  the first 
credit line from Exim Bank coincided with the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation´s 
(Sinopec) first acquisition within Angola, in the form of  a 50% stake in the oilfield block 18, 
for the alleged sum of  US$ 725 million (CORKIN 2011, p.2). Block 18, was to be sold by 
Shell to Indian Oil & Gas National Company (ONGC) yet, the Angolan SOE, Sonangol, 
used its preemptive right to make sure that Sinopec was given first priority. Hence, Sinopec 
Overseas Oil & Gas was established as a joint venture between the Chinese and Angolan 
SOEs in September 2004 (ALVES 2013, p.108).   
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In the course of  the past decade, two further credit lines financing projects of  the 
Angolan governments Infrastructures Program were extended by the Exim Bank in 2007 
(ALVES 2010, p.11) and a third in 2009 (Ibid, 13). The loans have been paralleled by a rapid 
rise in the total value of  Chinese crude imports from Angola, up from US$1 billion in 2002 
to US$33,3 billion in 2012 (ITC, 2014). Consequentially, since 2007, China has been the main 
destination for Angolan crude exports, accounting for some 43% in 2010 (ALVES 2013, 
p.107). Angola has thus become a central oil supplier for China, and has on two occasions, 
in early 2006 and in the beginning of  2008, overtaken Saudi Arabia as the main source of  
Chinese crude imports (Ibid 2010, pp.8-9). In 2006, China became Angola´s largest trading 
partner; a position which it has come to occupy evermore markedly since then (ITC, 2014).  
The relationship between financial and infrastructure provision on one hand, and 
increased access to hydrocarbon resources on the other, has not only been evident in cases 
when interests between China and Angola have coincided, but also in cases when the absence 
of  the former appears to have negatively affected the later. This became evident in the case 
of  the Lobito refinery, which was to be constructed as a US$3.5 billion joint venture between 
Sinopec and Sonangol. The deal was signed in 2005 upon the concession of  rights to develop 
the oil fields of  block 15/06, 17/06 and 18/06, to Sinopec (ALVES 2010, p.19). Yet, the 
joint project encountered a significant obstacle related to disagreements between Sinopec 
and Sonangol, about which markets the refinery would supply; whereas Sinopec wanted 
production to fit technical requirements for supplying Asian markets, Sonangol intended to 
supply domestic markets and sell excess capacity to Europe. The divergences between the 
two SOEs eventually resulted in Sonangol going forward with the project alone, and the 
Angolan government auctioning the blocks which Sinopec initially had gained the right to 
develop (Ibid p.19).          
  The deep economic engagement by China has had a broad range of  ramifications 
within Angolan society. Whilst some measures might have been related to the initial object 
of  securing access for Chinese companies to the country's crude reserves, they may also, 
depending on how they are perceived by different sectors within the population, produce 
either negative or positive feedbacks, which will determine the possibilities for further 
Chinese involvement. The Exim credit lines, which have constituted the backbone of  
Chinese strategy to facilitate access Angolan crude reserves, have been materialized as a range 
of  oil-backed credits within health, education, energy, agriculture and telecommunications 
(CAMPOS & VINES 2008, p. 8). Educational cooperation between the two countries has 
also made it possible for Angolan students and specialists to be trained in China (BURGOS 
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& EAR 2010, pp.358-359). Angola observer Ana Christina Alves, notes that the maintenance 
of  a healthy relationship to the Angolan leadership has been an essential part of  the deep 
Chinese engagement within the country (ALVES 2010, p.24) but also that the financing of  
infrastructure and influx of  cheap Chinese consumer goods has been well regarded in the 
population at large (Ibid, p.15). On the other hand, the alleged willingness to use bribery as 
a means to obtain contracts and the high degree of  absence of  political and governance 
related conditions attached, has also been criticized by oppositional forces within Angola, 
claiming that these practices undermine efforts to improve public accountability and good 
administration. Likewise, parts of  the Angolan private sector have also criticized Chinese 
enterprises operating in Angola for relying excessively upon imported Chinese workforce 
and of  underbidding local competitors. (SUTTER 2012, p.312; BURGOS & EAR 2012, 
p.358) The use of  imported labor has not only been the case within civil construction 
projects, but has also been clearly evident within the oil sector, where cases have shown that 
Chinese enterprises hire significantly less Angolans when compared to Western companies 
(HORTA 2009). The need for reconstruction, high degree of  financing and low competition 
has made Angola a particularly lucrative market for Chinese enterprises and construction 
business (CAMPOS & VINES 2008, p.19).  
The close entanglement of  access to natural resources conditioned upon 
infrastructure provision, which in turn is provided by Chinese contractors, has also often 
been referred to as the "Angola model". The lack of  further political conditions, raises the 
question of  whether the ''Angola model'', which clearly reflects the Chinese embracement 
of  the principle of  non-intervention, should be seen as an opportunistic short term strategy, 
or rather as a cornerstone in long term Chinese foreign engagement.  
  
6. CHINA IN VENEZUELA; PRAGMATISM ABOVE ALL 
 With an abundance of  hydrocarbon resources, Latin America has gained a central 
role within the Chinese strategy to ensure energy diversification at the outset of  the 21st 
century (BECARD 2013, p.229) which has led to a notable intensification of  relations with 
governments within the region (KOTSCHWR et al 2012, p.2). Venezuela has become of  
particular interest to the Chinese, as a consequence of  its enormous reserves of  heavy 
bitumen crude, which according the US Geological Survey may amount to some 513 billion 
barrels of  recoverable oil (USGS 2009). From diplomatic ties were established between The 
Peoples Republic of  China and Venezuela in 1974 and until 1999, the Sino-Venezuelan 
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relationship was characterized by sporadic high-level contact and modest economic 
interaction (HONGBO 2014, p.650). Chinese oil companies have been operating in 
Venezuela since 1997, when they gained access to the Caracoles and Intercampo oilfields in 
the Maracaibo region (ELLIS 2010, p.3) but relations were significantly intensified by the 
election of  Hugo Chavez Frías in 1999 (HONGBO 2014, p.651).   
On Hugo Chavez first visit to China as newly elected in 1999, Memoranda of  
Understanding were signed on mutual investment protection agreements, the establishment 
of  a Mixed Joint Energy Committee and finally regarding a credit loan to Venezuela provided 
by the Bank of  China. A few years later in 2001, a strategic partnership of  common 
development was signed between the two countries, along with the creation of  a Sino-
Venezuelan commission for high-level exchange (NOESSELT and SOLIZ-LANDIVAR 
2013, p.4). The same year, China and Venezuela also agreed upon a bilateral Strategic Energy 
Plan, intended to extend until 2011, implying a planned increase in Venezuelan oil exports to 
China and a substantial Chinese financing of  Venezuelan railway construction (CHENG & 
SHI 2008, p.123). Over the following years, the cooperation between the two nations came 
to approximate an institutionalized model founded upon the oil sector, with Chinese credits 
financing infrastructure, social services, technology, mining and agricultural development, 
conditioned upon the repayment of  Venezuelan crude exports to China (DOWNS 2011, 
p.51). Joint measures have also extended to the provision of  oil rigs by Chinese enterprises, 
construction of  oil tankers as well as the establishment of  a US$6 billion refinery for 
processing the Venezuelan bitumen crude in the Chinese Guangdong province (ELLIS 2010, 
p.9). The Sino-Venezuelan cooperation is thus a result of  the high degree of  economic 
complementarity, and fundamentally driven by market forces, yet, molded by the strong direct 
involvement of  both governments (HONGBO 2014, p.654).   
A paramount pillar within the energy related cooperation has nevertheless been the 
creation of  a financing mechanism in form of  the China-Venezuelan Joint Fund in 2007, by 
the China Development Bank, CNPC and the Venezuelan Bank for Economic and Social 
Development - or BANDES. (DOWNS 2011, p.49). The fund has functioned as the main 
vehicle for the concession of  three grand loans: of  US$6 billion in 2007, US$20 billion in 
April 2010 and US$12 billion in June the same year, all to be repaid over a 10 year period 
(ELLIS 2010, p.3). The extension of  the large loans in 2010, coincided with the China 
National Offshore Development Company (CNODC) obtaining the right to develop the 
Junin-4 block in the Orinoco field, through a joint venture with PDVSA. The same year 
CNPC also accounted for operations of  15 mature fields in the Anzoátegui province (Ibid, 
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p.8).  In 2012, a second agreement for a US$12 billion Joint Fund was made, with the China 
Development Bank and Venezuela's National Development fund contributing with the 
financing, which was to take place in a dual stage of  implementation (HONGBO 2014, 
p.655). The agreement implied a series of  investments in a broad spectrum of  the 
Venezuelan economy, spanning from the electricity grid, construction of  thermo generation 
plants, a hydro-electrical plant, railways, agricultural development, telecommunications as 
well as the obligation to further invest in the Orinoco region (SAMPER 2012, p.8). Yet, with 
financial problems and an oil production stagnated around 2,5 million barrels pr. day, 
Venezuela has been in need of  credit, which led to a third US$18 billion financing agreement 
with China in 2013. The arrangement was conditional upon implementation in three stages, 
and meant that debt repayment in form of  crude would amount to some 230.000 barrels pr. 
day (HONGBO 2014, p.655). The Sino-Venezuelan relationship has thereby come to assume 
noticeable asymmetrical features during recent years, with the large loans being repaid with 
increasing crude exports to China, roughly reaching 500,000 barrels pr. day in 2014, of  which 
nearly half  went to the repayment of  prior debt obligations (CUNNIGHAM 2014). 
Recent relations between China and Venezuela have also extended beyond the 
energy sector and implied a range of  issues indirectly concerned with this. During recent 
years, Venezuela has purchased fighter jets and air defense systems and also acquired 
important military technology (ELLIS 2010, p.5). Apart from the military domain, exchanges 
have also taken place in cultural, educational and scientific fields (HONGBO 2014, p.651). 
An essential point, which inevitably has smoothened general cooperation between China and 
Venezuela, has been the latter's firm support for the One-China policy. Of  the modest sized 
group of  states which fully recognize Taiwan the day today, 11 are to be found within the 
Central American and Caribbean Region. Though presently an informal understanding exists 
between China and Taiwan, regarding not to seek to actively push any nation to switch 
recognition, the issue continues to be of  high importance to both countries. In this respect, 
Venezuela is in a key position for China, as the South American country exports subsidized 
oil within the Petrocaribe scheme, which benefits many of  the countries recognizing Taiwan 
within the region, and thereby also constitutes a significant economic leverage for Caracas 
(ELLIS 2010, p.7).   
On the geostrategic level, Venezuela´s challenge to US hegemony within the region 
may also coincide with the general Chinese interests within the region, and thereby stimulates 
a certain Sino-Venezuelan alignment. This loosely shared worldview nevertheless covers over 
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significant differences when translated into specific objectives by each country. An essential 
goal for China within Latin America is access to the region´s natural resources, but within 
this search, China has strictly avoided the costs of  challenging the US within the region 
(SUTTER 2012, p.314). The opposition to the FTAA as well as the aversion towards neo-
liberal capitalism, has undeniably created space for China and its enterprises to get a stronger 
foothold within the region (ELLIS 2010, p.6).  The assenting political orientation of  Caracas 
has similarly led to a relatively privileged positioning within the Venezuelan market for 
Chinese companies (Ibid, 4). Nonetheless, the sheer size of  the US market and the vital 
importance of  the Chinese trade surplus with it, has meant that China has been very careful 
not to take any steps which might lead to a more protectionist United States (DANREUTER 
2011, p.1350). Hence, the Venezuelan hopes that China might move in the direction of  a 
strategic alliance, have thus been kept at an arm's length by China. Good working relations 
with the US have thereby come to outweigh the strategic partnership with Venezuela 
(CHENG & SHI 2008, p.140). 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS UPON THE NATURE OF POWER AND 
CHINESE OIL ACQUISITIONS 
 As the analysis of  the country cases indicates, the Chinese aspirations to access oil 
deposits have been strongly supported by infrastructure provision, construction projects and 
financial credits issued below special terms. These measures approximate what Chen & 
Chang (2013) conceptualize as the application of  material resources for the goal of  
´attraction´, be it economic aid, or military, civil, or industry cooperation; or rather, soft hard-
power. In this respect the Chinese oil companies do appear to have been adhering to a market 
oriented logic of  seeking profitable investment. The unorthodox features of  their strategy 
have rather been related to the strong support from Chinese public institutions in order to 
facilitate their access and operational environment, primarily through significant material 
inducements to oil rich countries. What also stands clear from the cases reviewed, is that the 
main power resources applied by China in relation to the obtainment of  energy, have been 
of  a markedly tangible character. Whether this has to do with the very nature of  policies 
related to the energy sector stands as an open question. However, some measures which have 
do to with a more immaterial, "soft", as well as intangible power-resource domain, are worth 
keeping in mind. These could be mentioned as the Chinese educational cooperation with 
both Angola and Venezuela, as well as the institutionalization promoting a constructive 
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approach to common challenges, which the energy cooperation with Kazakhstan has 
stimulated.   
In the case of  Venezuela, a certain degree of  apparent ideological alignment and 
shared worldview, seems to have facilitated cooperation within the energy sector. The shared 
anti-hegemonic ideals and "Global South" political identity are worth mentioning as a 
ideational soft-power resources, which are likely to have facilitated energy cooperation. In 
the China-Venezuelan case, though, it is important to keep an eye on the contextual nature 
which has allowed this normative power capability to become evident: the political identity 
of  the Venezuelan governments since 1999 and its opposition to the elements of  the 
international system with roots in a occidental neo-liberal order. This has resulted in a high 
measure of  proneness to Chinese engagement within the country, and Caracas in many 
respects appears to have been the active part, in trying to forge an ideological dimension to 
the economic complementarities between the two nations. In the Chinese strategy for 
international insertion, the foreign policy principles of  keeping a low profile and of  de-
ideologization of  the country´s foreign policy, seem to have overshadowed any possible 
interests in challenging US hegemony.          
The indications that the Chinese projection of  soft-hard power in Angola has 
produced a positive attitude towards China within some segments of  society, also blurs the 
picture of  what at first appears to be a very materialist Chinese energy strategy: soft-hard 
power application producing soft-soft power. Importantly, this raises the question of  power 
dynamics as a reciprocal force, initially exercised by one party, but in the process of  being 
absorbed by the other, transforming into another power domain and opening new channels 
for the projection of   different power resources. This also paves the way for a more 
constructivist focus upon the culture which characterizes the interactions in a particular 
temporal and spatial context, rather than trying to deduce specific power resource variables 
which supposedly would shape the outcome of  interactions. Furthermore, it raises the 
question of  whether it is indeed possible to meaningfully try to separate the hard and soft 
nature of  power, and whether the essential objective should not rather be to evaluate the 
conjunction of  different channels activated in the attempts of  power projection, some 
pertaining to the soft, others to the hard realm.  
Joseph Nye (2011) does treat the complexities of  the interconnection between hard 
and soft power through the notion of  ´smart power´, within the strategies of  both small and 
large states, and also proves that these historically tend to be complementary forces. Though 
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the cases examined within this paper indicate the presence of  some modest soft-power 
projection, they generally conclude that the Chinese strategy in relation to oil rich countries, 
relies heavily on materialist inducement in the form of  tangible power resources. In this 
regard, the development over time is an aspect which has been difficult to examine, because 
of  the relatively recentness of  the strong Chinese engagement in obtaining natural resources 
abroad. This poses two relevant questions: the first relates to whether economic interactions 
actually provide an initial and necessary basis, upon which an institutionalized cooperation 
and, eventually, channels for ideational and cultural interactions and influence subsequently 
will emerge? The second question relates to whether the imbalances inherent in the economic 
asymmetries and diverging strategic exceptions, in the case of  Venezuela, or the tensions 
which the strong sudden presence of  China in Angola has provoked in some parts of  society, 
are indeed rendering a pragmatically materialist focused power projection strategy as an 
attractive option in the long run? This issue leads attention towards complexities inherent in 
the process of  power exercise, which lie at the hearth of  Nye´s notion of  smart power. In 
line with this approach, the first question to ask would be related to Chinas preferred 
outcome from its interactions with oil providers, while other central queries would be 
concerned with context, the preferences of  partners and the probabilities of  success. From 
the previous analysis it stands clear that the application of  available power recourses, in the 
existing context, has been successful in providing energy recourses in the intermediate term. 
Yet, whether the complicated principle of  non-intervention or the often diffuse ''southern 
common identity'' is indeed a stable basis for China´s relations with its offshore providers, 
stands as a very open question. If  China seeks to make these initial commercial contacts 
constitute the foundation for deeper future cooperation, it might find it necessary to consider 
its own interests more closely together with those of  its partners. As the Chinese foreign oil 
dependence does not appear to be diminishing within any near future, the feedback from the 
initial experiences of  acquiring this resource abroad, should imply valuable knowledge for 
defining a more sustainable long-term relationship with overseas providers. 
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